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Savitz: Judicial Exceptions to Section 337: A Return to Court Holding

NOTES
JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION 337:
A RETURN TO COURT HOLDING?*
Corporate liquidations involve complex legal transactions. A careful tax
strategist must be aware of the effect of liquidation on shareholders as well as
on the liquidating corporation. In a typical liquidation,1 individual shareholders recognize gain to the extent of the difference between the basis of their
stock and the value of the liquidating dividend received.2 The liquidating
corporation may recognize gain on the disposition of property with a fair
market value in excess of its adjusted basis. 3 A tax imposed on this corporate
level gain is, in essence, a double tax passed on to the shareholders via liqui4
dating dividends reduced by the amount of tax paid by the corporation.
Whether a tax is imposed on this corporate gain is dependent on the nature
of the properties in the corporation and the method of disposing of these
properties.
There are three general ways in which corporate assets are disposed of in
liquidation: distribution and shareholder retention, distribution and shareholder sale, and corporate sale and distribution of proceeds. If the liquidating
corporation distributes the property in kind to shareholders pursuant to a
liquidation, and if the shareholders are content to retain the assets, realized
gain generally will be unrecognized by the corporation in accordance with section 336.5 But the likelihood that the shareholders will prefer to receive cash
or its equivalent in return for their stock 6 suggests that this method of liquidation is impractical. If the corporation distributes the assets to the shareholders
and the shareholders sell the assets after liquidation, realized gain should be
protected by section 336 and the shareholders in effect receive liquidating div*EDITOR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the winter 1974 quarter.
1. This note is not primarily concerned with the liquidation of a wholly-owned subsidiary under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §332 or with a one-month liquidation under INT. REV.
CODE OF

1954, §333.

2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §331(a)(1) provides: "COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS.Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock."
3. See text accompanying notes 41-46 infra.
4. If the corporation has not retained enough assets with which to satisfy the tax liability,
the shareholders are liable for the tax. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6901(a)(1). If the shareholders
are required to satisfy the tax liability, they may be allowed a capital loss deduction in the
year the tax is paid. See generally Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10
TAX L. REV. 381, 399 (1955).
5.

INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §336 provides: "Except as provided in section 453(d) (relating

to disposition of installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation
on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation."
6. "The purpose of a corporate liquidation is often to set the stage for a sale of the
distributed property by the shareholders." Bittker, Taxation of Complete Liquidations, TuL.
18Tr TAX INsT. 610, 659 (1959).
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idends in cash. Unfortunately, this theoretically ideal method of liquidation
carries with it the risk that the Internal Revenue Service will attribute the sale
to the corporation. Furthermore, the apportioning of assets among shareholders
is often a difficult procedure. 7 As a result, many corporations sell assets before
liquidating and distribute the proceeds to the shareholders. When the corporation sells property prior to liquidation, or if the Internal Revenue Service
asserts that the sale of corporate assets constructively occurred before liquidation, the shareholders will argue that the sale occurred in accordance with the
requirements of section 337.1 If a liquidating corporation complies with the
mandates of section 337, certain corporate property may be sold in the year
prior to the liquidation and realized gain will go unrecognized. 9
This note examines the legislative and judicial history of sections 336 and
337 and the statutory and judicial exceptions to the nonrecognition provisions
of each. To the extent there are exceptions to one section that are not applicable to the other, the note explores the effect of these differences on the planning and execution of corporate liquidations.
THE

HISToIUCAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 1954 no Code section specifically dealt with the treatment of corporate level gain realized in the course of a liquidation.' 0 The tax consequences of liquidation were dependent on whether corporation property was
distributed in kind to the shareholders or whether the property was sold by
the corporation and the proceeds distributed to the shareholders. On the one
hand, the Treasury acknowledged as early as 1921 that a liquidating dividend
of appreciated corporate property was not a proper occasion to tax the corporation. 1 Treasury regulations adhered to this position until the enactment

7. 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1430, 1433 (1969). See also Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation
Under Section 337, 76 HARV. L. REv. 780, 781 (1963).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §337 provides in part: "(a) GENERAL RULE.- If ...
(1) a
corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1964, and (2) within
the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of

the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it
of property within such 12-month period."
9. For a discussion of the technical requirements of §337, see Bureau of National Affairs,
PORTFOLIO ON TAX MANAGEMENT No. 18-4th, Corporate Liquidations Under Section 337
(1970).
10. See 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §17.05a (rev. ed. 1971).
This note will address itself solely to the recognition or nonrecognition of gain. In most cases,
a liquidating corporation with potential losses will attempt to avoid the nonrecognition pro-

visions of §§336 and 337.
11. Treas. Reg. art. 548, §62 (1921). This philosophy is consistent with the general
principle that ordinary dividends of appreciated property will not be taxed to the corporation. See, e.g., General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 1936-1 U.S.T.C. 2f9012
(1935); Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1252 (1955). Cf. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §311.
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of section 336.12 Nevertheless, in view of the problems associated with allocating corporate assets among shareholders and the desires of shareholders to recoup their investment in a liquid form, this alternative was not an acceptable
method of liquidation in many instances." On the other hand, if appreciated
corporate assets were sold prior to liquidation, gain was recognized by the
corporation. 4 Even if the sale were completed shortly before liquidation, the
corporation was still in existence and therefore taxable as an entity separate
and apart from its shareholders.'5 Although the shareholders received liquidation proceeds in cash, the amount available for distribution was reduced by
the tax paid at the corporate level.
To achieve nonrecognition of corporate gain and receipt of cash by the
shareholders, corporations began to use the "distribute and sell" method of
liquidation. Under this approach, the corporation distributed its assets in
kind to shareholders and the shareholders themselves sold the property. The
corporation was not taxed on the distribution of property in kind, 16 and the
shareholders received a stepped-up basis in the property as a result of the
taxable exchange of stock for assets." Sale of the assets by the shareholders
after liquidation was taxed only to the extent of postliquidation appreciation."'
The usefulness of the distribute and sell method was severely curtailed in
1945 by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.19
After Court Holding Company officials completed preliminary negotiations to
sell the corporation's sole asset, an apartment building, a meeting was scheduled with the buyer to reduce to writing the terms and conditions of the sale.
At that meeting the purchaser was unexpectedly told that the sale could not be
completed as originally planned because a substantial tax liability would be
imposed at the corporate level. The following day the corporation was liquidated and the apartment building was distributed in kind to the shareholders.
12. Treas. Reg. 103, §19.22(a)-21 (1939); Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-20 (1943); Treas. Reg.
118, §39.22(a)-20 (1953).
13. See notes 6, 7 supra.
14. The corporation was taxed as a distinct entity under the general provisions of the
predecessors of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1001(a). See also Treas. Reg. 111, §22(a)-18 (1952),
which provides in part: "If property is acquired and later sold for an amount in excess of
the cost or other basis, the gain on the sale is income. If, then, a corporation sells its capital
assets in whole or in part, it shall include in its gross income for the year in which the sale
was made the gain from such sale .... "
15. See, e.g., Frank G. Warden, 23 B.T.A. 24 (1931) (the fact that the proceeds from the
sale of corporate assets were paid directly to the shareholders did not prevent a tax at the
corporate level).
16. See text accompanying notes 9, 10 supra.
17. Because the shareholders are taxed on the difference between the fair market value
of the liquidating dividend they receive and their stock basis under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§331(a), the shareholders obtain a basis in the distributed property equal to its fair market
value in accordance with INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1012.
18. If the property is sold immediately after liquidation, the amount realized by the
shareholders should equal the property's fair market value. Consequently, the shareholders

would realize zero gain on such a sale.
19.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §1001(a).

324 U.S. 331, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 19215 (1945).
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The corporation reported no recognized gain on the distribution of the appreciated building. Subsequently, the shareholders sold the building to the
original purchaser under terms and conditions substantially indentical to those
in the previous agreement. Stating that "[t]he incidence of taxation depends
upon the substance of a transaction,"' - the Supreme Court held that the sale
by the shareholders was attributable to the liquidated Court Holding Company and that a tax liability was owed at the corporate level on the gain
21
realized by sale of the building.
Just five years after Court Holding the Supreme Court was presented with
an almost identical factual setting in United States v. Cumberland Public
Service Co. 22 Distinguishing Court Holding on grounds that the sale in that
case had been negotiated by the shareholders in their capacity as representatives of the corporation,2 3 the Court in Cumberland upheld the validity of the
postliquidation sale by the shareholders as individuals. As a result, no tax was
imposed at the corporate level. Actually, ,the only real difference between the
two cases is that the taxpayers in Cumberland had the benefit of competent
legal advice earlier than their counterparts in Court Holding.24
After Court Holding and Cumberland it was not clear what steps were
necessary to avoid a double tax through the distribute and sell method of
corporate liquidation. Whether a sale of corporate assets after liquidation
would be attributed to the corporation essentially depended on a factual determination by the trial court. There were few guidelines for planners to follow; the only sure way to avoid the Court Holding result was not to negotiate
asset sales prior to final liquidation. 25 Nevertheless, the need to insure that
corporate property could be sold after the liquidation often outweighed the
risk of double taxation, and shareholders therefore "persisted in their evil
custom of arranging for the sale of their corporation's property before con26
sulting their lawyers.."

20. Id. at 882, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. at 10,928.
21. Id.
22. 338 U.S. 451, 1950-1 U.S.T.C. 19129 (1950).
23. The Cumberland shareholders had first offered to sell their shares of stock to the
purchaser. When the purchaser refused to buy the stock, plans were made for liquidation.
There are many reasons for a purchaser not wanting to acquire a corporation's assets by a
purchase of controlling stock: the possibility of undisclosed contingent liabilities of the old
corporation, a low basis in the assets, a large earnings and profits account, and an unfavorable accounting method.
24. See B. BrrrIcK & J. EUSTCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-

111.63, at 11-57 (abr. ed. 1971).
25. Factors considered important were the capacity in which the shareholders negotiated
the sale of the assets and the extent of the negotiations as of the date of liquidation. See
Doyle Hosiery Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 641 (1951), acquiesced in 1952-2 CUM.-BULL. 1;

HOLDERS

Mintz, Recent Developments Under the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland Public Service
Co. Cases, N.Y.U. 11T INST. ON FED. TAX. 873 (1953).
26. Bittker, supra note 6, at 663.
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Statutory Changes in the 1954 Code
Realizing that attention to formalities was the sole reason the shareholders
in Cumberland avoided the double tax liability of Court Holding, Congress
labeled the two decisions "a trap for the unwary" 27 and attempted to rectify
this obvious inequity by two changes in the 1954 Code. First, Congress enacted
section 336 as an embodiment of the principle already well established by
Treasury regulations28 that a corporation does not recognize gain or loss on
29
the distribution of property to shareholders in the course of a liquidation.
Although legislative comment on section 336 is sparse, it seems clear that Congress anticipated few exceptions to its nonrecognition provisions."
As a companion to section 336, Congress enacted section 337, the "antiCourt Holding Co. provision," which allows a corporation to sell certain property in the year prior to liquidation and not recognize gain or loss on the
transaction.31 Even if a postliquidation sale of assets is attributed to the corporation under the rationale of Court Holding, a tax at the corporate level
may nevertheless be avoided if section 337 applies.
Although the primary purpose of section 337 is elimination of the Court
Holding-Cumberland trap32 the legislative history of the section reflects congressional resolve that gain from sales made in the ordinary course of business
not go unrecognized. This issue was not as troublesome with regard to section
336 because its nonrecognition provisions applied only after the ordinary
course of business was ended. 3 3 In drafting section 337 Congress encountered

27. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
28. See text accompanying notes 11, 12 supra.
29. See note 5 supra.
30. When the Revenue Act of 1954 was first introduced in Congress there were no exceptions to the nonrecognition of gain to the liquidating corporation. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. §§308(a), (d) (1954). When the final version was passed as §336 the only exception
to the general rule of nonrecognition was a disposition of §453(d) installment obligations.
31. See note 8 supra. See generally TREAS. REG. §§1.337-1, -2, -3, -4.
32. "Accordingly, under present law the tax consequences arising from sales made in the
course of liquidations may depend primarily upon the formal manner in which the transactions are arranged. Your committee intends in section 337 to provide a definitive rule which
will eliminate the present uncertainties." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1954).
Accord, H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A106 (1954). "[T]he purpose of section 337
was to do away with the necessity of deciding who made the sale as long as the corporation
is in a state of complete liquidation."
33. The only statutory exception to §336 involves §453(d) installment obligations acquired as a result of sales in the ordinary course of business. See text accompanying note 46
infra. In keeping with a general intent not to tax mere changes in the form of a business
venture, Congress decided against making a liquidation a time to tax the unrealized appreciation in value of the corporation's assets. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §351. One commentator
disagrees and suggests: "[I]t is certainly not unreasonable to treat the time of distribution as
an appropriate point for the corporation to recognize gain." McGaffey, The Rationale and
Requirements of Section 337, 40 TAXES 681, 687 (1962). He argues: "[S]ince the corporation,
during its life, had the use and received the benefit of an appreciated asset, it is not unfair
to subject it to the corporate tax on liquidation." Id. at 689. See also Eustice, Contract Rights,
Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income - The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX. L. REv. 1, 72-73 (1964).
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difficulty defining sales in the ordinary course if business. The House version
of the section included broad categories of assets whose disposition might result in the recognition of ordinary income at the corporate level. 34 The Senate
Finance Committee, no doubt swayed by testimony during hearings, 5 apparently believed that the problems of conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain were best solved by a separate Code section on collapsible corporations and that section 337 should be designed solely to reconcile Court Holding and Cumberland.36 Nevertheless, the final version of section 337 contains
provisions aimed at preventing nonrecognition of gain from sales in the ordi37
nary course of business.
No such qualification exists in section 336. The reason for this difference
between two sections designed to accord identical tax treatment is that it is
more difficult to conceptualize gain realized by a corporation no longer in
existence than it is to visualize gain realized by a corporation that will continue to transact business for as long as a year after the sale.38
Even though sections 336 and 337 were generally intended to be nonrecognition provisions, the distribution or sale of particular kinds of corporate property will generate recognizable gain. Because a tax imposed on the liquidating
corporation can substantially reduce the amount received by the shareholders, 39

34. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §333 (1954), provided that gain from the sale of corporate assets in the year prior to liquidation would not be recognized unless the sale was:
"(1) a sale in the ordinary course of business, or (2) a sale of an inventory asset, as defined
in section 336(d), where the amount received for such asset exceeds 120 per cent of the adjusted basis of such asset."
"Inventory assets" were defined to include: "(1) Property of a kind which would properly
be includible in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable year;
(2) Property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of its trade or business; (3) Rights to income to the extent not previously includible in income under the method of accounting employed by the corporation except rights to income
arising by reason of sales subject to section 333; and (4) Property described in section 1231(b)
•.. held for a period of less than 5 years." H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. §336(d) (1954).
35. The Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association pointed out that one goal
of changes in the rules of corporate liquidations in H.R. 8300 is: "[T]o assure that mere
formal differences in the method of disposition of corporate assets upon liquidation . . .
should not make a difference in the tax consequences. A second purpose is to assure that the
appreciation on 'inventory assets' will not, through liquidation, escape tax in the same manner and amount that would have been incurred in the absence of such liquidation. In the
effort to achieve the second purpose, the former purpose has been defeated, in all cases where
a corporation holds 'appreciated inventory."' Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance,83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 377 (1954). See also id. pt. 3, at 1534-35.
36. S. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49, 258-59 (1954).
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §337(b)(1)(A) provides that "stock in trade of the corporation,
or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the dose of the taxable year, and property held by the corporation
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business" may not be
sold without recognition of gain. See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
38. INT. Ray,. CODE OF 1954, §337(a) requires that all assets be sold or otherwise distributed in complete liquidation within 12 months of the date of the adoption of the plan of
liquidation. See note 9 supra.
39. See, e.g., B.BrrrKE & J. EusTricE, supra note 24, at 11-53.
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the efficient planning of liquidations requires accurate knowledge of the scope
of each section. Additionally, to the extent any given asset may not be sold
pursuant to section 337 without recognition of gain but may be distributed in
kind under section 336 in a tax-free transaction, the congressional intent underlying section 337 is defeated.

40

CONSISTENT EXCEPTIONS TO SECTIONS

336

AND

337

Gain inherent in certain types of corporate property is recognized by the
liquidating corporation regardless of whether the property is sold before liquidation in accordance with section 337 or is distributed in kind to the shareholders pursuant to section 336. Although such gain recognition is contrary to
the general nonrecognition provisions of both sections, as long as a particular
type of property is accorded the same tax treatment under either section the
purpose behind the two sections remains inviolate. Shareholders of the liquidating corporation do not have to resort to the distribute and sell method and
face possible application of the Court Holding doctrine.
Statutory Exceptions
Several Code sections specifically override the nonrecognition provisions of
sections 336 and 337. For example, section 47 recaptures section 38 investment
credits when section 38 property 41 is disposed of prior to the end of its useful
life. 42 Similarly, if section 1245 depreciable personal property, 43 section 1250
depreciable realty, 41 or farm property subject to sections 1251 or 1252,45 is
distributed to shareholders under section 336 or is sold under section 337,
gain will be recognized. Additionally, both section 336 and section 337 require gain to be recognized on the disposition of installment obligations arising from sales in the ordinary course of business in accordance with the man4

dates of section 453(d). "

Since section 337(b)(l)(A) requires recognition of gain from the sale of inventory or stock in trade 4 7 and section 336 contains no such qualification, a
discrepancy between the two sections appears to exist. Actually, there is no

40. See note 32 supra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§38, 48(a).
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §47. See also Franklin Clayton, 52 T.C. 911 (1969); TREAs.

41.

REG. §1.47-2.

43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1245. See Gardner, The Impact of Sections 1215 and 1250
on CorporateLiquidations, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1964).
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1250. See generally Eiseman, Section 337 LiquidationsTheir Snares and Uncertainties,22 ARK. L. REV. 300, 305-06 (1968).
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1251, 1252.

46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §453(d). For suggestions on how to liquidate under §337 and
still have the benefits of installment reporting of gain, see Galant, Section 337 and the
Rushing Case, 50 TAXES 216 (1972); Smith, Recent Cases Show Ways To Avoid or Defer

Gain on 337 Liquidation, 35 J. TAXATION 90 (1971).
47. See note 37 supra.
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discrepancy. Under section 336, inventory may be distributed to shareholders
with no tax imposed at the corporate level even if the shareholders sell the
inventory pursuant to doing business in an unincorporated status.48 Under
section 337 if the shareholders decide to liquidate and sell all of the inventory
in one transaction to one purchaser no tax is imposed at the corporate level. 49
These results are in accord with congressional intent to permit mere changes
in the form of business to go untaxedY5 If the corporation decides to liquidate
and continues to sell its inventory in the ordinary course of business, however,
the gain will be taxed to the corporation because sales of that type are inconsistent with the liquidation concept. 51
NonstatutoryExceptions
In addition to specific Code sections requiring recognition of gain, the
"Clear Reflection of Income" doctrine 2 and the "Assignment of Income"
doctrine 53 have been held to override the nonrecognition provisions of sections 336 and 337.54 Because these basic principles of tax law have been applied
to both sections, their use has not created significant disparity in the tax consequences attendant to the two methods of disposing of corporate property. 55
For example, in Williamson v. United States,56 a cash method corporation

48. If negotiations have proceeded too far before liquidation occurs, there is the possibility that the Commissioner will argue that the sale occurred before liquidation under the
Court Holding rationale. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341.
49. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §337(b)(2) provides in part: "[I]f substantially all of the
property ...

which is attributable to a trade or business of the corporation is .

.

. sold or

exchanged to one person in one transaction" then no gain is recognized on the sale or exchange.
50.

See also Ir.

REv. CODE OF 1954, §351.

51. See note 37 supra.
52. Pursuant to INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §446(b), the Commissioner may compel a taxpayer to change accounting methods if the method being used does not "clearly reflect income." See Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330, 1951-2 U.S.T.C. §9376 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); Jud Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 681, 1946-1 U.S.T.C. ff9177 (5th Cir. 1946).
53. See, e.g., Siegel v. United States, 464 F.2d 891, 1972-2 U.S.T.C. §f9566 (9th Cir. 1972)
(distribution to shareholders of corporate rights in motion picture photoplays); Family Record
Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 208, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. §f9781 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 910 (1963) (sale under §337 of customer's contracts); Commissioner v. First State
Bank, 168 F.2d 1004, 1948-2 U.S.T.C. §f9317 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948) (distribution of previously deducted notes). See generally Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income:
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 295 (1962).
54.

See generally Eustice, supra note 33.

55. Some courts refuse to require a liquidating corporation to recognize income items
that are too contingent to have been validly earned by the corporation. See, e.g., The Shea
Co., 53 T.C. 135 (1969), acquiesced in 1970-2 Cum. BULL. xxi; James Poro, 39 T.C. 641 (1963),
acquiesced in 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 5; United Mercantile Agencies, 34 T.C. 808 (1960), acquiesced in 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 5. These cases do not create a disparity in treatment between
§§336 and 337 because if the items were sold, it would be difficult to argue that they were
contingent.
56, 292 F,2d 524, 1961 U,ST.C. 99583 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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liquidated under section 336 and distributed accounts receivable of $192,000
to its sole shareholder without recognizing gain at the corporate level. The accounts receivable, representing amounts due the corporation for services
rendered, were collected by the shareholder after final liquidation. Applying
the Assignment of Income doctrine in lieu of section 336, the court held the
$192,000 taxable to the corporation because that entity had earned the income.5 7 Likewise, when a cash method corporation sold construction contracts
under which work was completed and payment was due, it was held that the
Assignment of Income doctrine required gain to be recognized to the liquidating corporation notwithstanding the nonrecognition provisions of section 337.58
Consistency is maintained, therefore, whether corporate assets in the form of
earned but untaxed income rights are sold under section 337 or are distributed
in kind under section 336. In both instances recognized income is generated at
the corporate level.
INCONSISTENT EXCEPTIONS TO SECTIONS

336

AND

337

As cases have arisen interpreting sections 336 and 337, it has been relatively
easy for courts to find exceptions to the nonrecognition provisions of both
where a corporation attempts to avoid tax by assigning income to another
entity pursuant to liquidation.59 Similarly, specific Code sections requiring recapture of depreciation have been applied equally to sections 336 and 337
whether the depreciated property was sold or distributed in kind. 0 Where
more subtle forms of economic benefits are involved, however, the method of
liquidation is becoming increasingly important in terms of tax liability. For
example, the tax benefit doctrine has clearly been held applicable to liquidations under section 337 and inapplicable to section 336 liquidations.61 Additionally, the Corn Products doctrine has recently been employed to override
the nonrecognition provisions of section 337 but is seemingly inapplicable to
distributions under section 336.62 As a result, in some situations it becomes
advisable for the shareholders of a liquidating corporation to reject section
337 and to distribute and then sell certain kinds of property. In doing so,
shareholders are again confronted with possible application of Court Holding.

57.

Id. at 531, 1961-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,409.

58. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9768 (9th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 909 (1963).
59. See note 53 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
61. See generally O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAx L.
REv. 215 (1972); Note, The Tax Benefit, Recoveries, and Sales of Property Under Section
337, 9 W. 9C MARY L. REV. 476 (1967).
62. See generally Note, The Applicability of the Corn Products Doctrine to Dispositions
of Section 1231 Property Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation, 51 B.U.L. REV. 120 (1971).
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Bad Debt Reserves
The tax benefit doctrine has created a discrepancy between methods of
liquidation where the liquidating corporation employs a system of bad debt
reserves. 63 Under such an accounting procedure an accrual method corporation
deducts from current income an amount estimated to represent accounts receivable that will never be collected.64 The corporation receives a tax benefit
by a reduction of its taxable income by the amount of the bad debt reserve.
For example, assume the hypothetical of an accrual method corporation with
accounts receivable for 1973 of $100 and bad debt reserves for that same year
of $5. Although the corporation has actually earned $100 in 1973, only $95
will ultimately be realized according to past experience. The bad debt reserve
deduction allows the corporation to decrease taxable income to $95.
Where the accounts receivable related to a bad debt reserve have a fair
market value equal to their net value (the face amount of accounts receivable
less bad debt reserves), no tax liability accrues to the liquidating corporation
regardless of the method of liquidation because no gain is realized on their
disposition.5 Where the actual value of the accounts receivable exceeds their
net value, however, the method of liquidation becomes crucial. Assume in the
above hypothetical that the fair market value of the accounts receivable is $97.
If the corporation distributes the accounts receivable in kind, no case has ever
required the $2 realized gain to be recognized. 66 If the corporation liquidates
under section 337 and sells the accounts receivable for $97, the tax benefit
doctrine requires the liquidating corporation to recognize $2 gain.67 Although
it is easier to visualize the gain realized by the corporation when accounts receivable supposedly worth $95 are actually sold before liquidation for $97, the
economic benefit is the same when those accounts receivable are distributed in

63. See Hertz, Liquidation of a Corporate Business in Kind, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED.
TAx. 969, 974-78 (1968); Note, The Treatment of the Bad Debt Reserve Under Section 337
of the InternalRevenue Code, 51 B.U.L. Rlv. 483 (1971).
64. INT. REv.CODE OF 1954, §166(c) provides that in lieu of a deduction for specific debts
that become worthless, a taxpayer may adopt-a reserve for bad debts. See also TRa.As. REC.
§1.1664.
65. If the bad debt reserve is ah accurate relresentation of accounts receivable that will
become uncollectible in the future, then the amount realized from a sale of the accounts
receivable should equal the net value of those receivables, and therefore no gain will be

realized. See Note, supra note 63, at 488.
66. See O'Hare, supra note 61, at 234.
67. Citizens' Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 751, 1972-2 U.S.T.C. §9510 (3d
Cir. 1972) (entire amount of bad debt reserve was income in the year of liquidation under
the tax benefit rule). See also Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932,
1961-2 U.S.T.C.1 9500 (Ct. Cl. 1961); West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47,
1961-1 U.S.T.C. §9281 (9th Cir. 1961); Bird Management, Inc., 48 T.C. 586 (1967); J.E. Hawes
Corp., 44'T.C.'705 (1965). But cf. Nash v, United States, 398 U.S, 1, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. §f9405
(1970).
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kind to shareholders and sold after liquidation. Nevertheless, the distribute
and sell method works to the shareholders' advantage in this instance.
Expensed Property
When the estimated life of an asset used in a trade or business is longer
than one year, the cost of the item is generally capitalized and the corporation
is allowed a section 167 depreciation deduction representing the decline in
value of the item for that year.6 9 When the asset is disposed of under section
336 or section 337, section 1245 generally requires recapture of the depreciation regardless of the nonrecognition provisions of the two sections. 70 When
the useful life of a business asset is less than one year, however, the cost of the
item is generally treated as a business expense and is deducted from gross income in the year the asset was acquired3 1 Because the basis of the asset is
thereby reduced to zero,7 2 any amount received when the asset is sold is gain.
Nevertheless, there is no section in the Code comparable to section 1245 that
requires recapture of gain realized if the asset is disposed of after it has been
expensed. As a result, courts have consistently held that if an expensed item
is sold after its cost has been deducted from gross income, the tax benefit
doctrine requires that the amount of the deduction be restored to income. 7In Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc.74 the Government argued that
the tax benefit doctrine should be applied to a liquidation under section 336
where corporate property is distributed in kind to shareholders.75 In that case,
South Lake Farms, Inc. had expended around $700,000 in one year cultivating
and planting its barley and cotton crops. The corporation had deducted the
$700,000 as an ordinary and necessary business expense in that year. Later that
same year, South Lake Farms, Inc. liquidated and distributed the unharvested
barley and cotton crops in kind to its successor. 7c The Commissioner asserted

68.
69.

See generally McGaffey, supra note 33, at 688.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §167. See generally 4 J.

MERTENS,

supra note 10, §23.31a.

70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1245. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
71. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162. See generally 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 10, §25A.01-.21.
72. Pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1016(a)(2)(A), the basis of property is reduced
by the amount allowed as a deduction in computing taxable income under §162. Since the
entire cost of the asset is written off as an ordinary and necessary business expense, the basis
is reduced to zero.
73. See note 61 supra. "The tax benefit rule provides that if amounts previously deducted from income for losses, expenses, bad debts, and other items provide a tax savings
and are recovered in subsequent years, such recoveries are considered income in the year of
recovery." Note, Federal Income Taxation - Tax Benefit Rule Applies to Gain from Sale of
Fully Expanded Rental Items Part of Section 37 Liquidation, 18 U. KAN. L. REI. 891, 892
(1970).
74. 324 F.2d 837, 1964-1 U.S.T.C. 9101 (9th Cir. 1963).
75. One commentator has labeled the case the "most notable effort of the Commissioner
to apply the tax benefit rule to a corporate liquidation where no sale of the corporate assets
occurred." O'Hare, supra note 61, at 324.
76. Although South Lake Farms, Inc. liquidated under the provisions of INT. REV. CODF
OF 1954, §334(b)(2), gain recognition or nonrecognition was calculated under §336.
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that regardless of the nonrecognition provisions of section 336, South Lake
Farms, Inc. should be required to pay tax on the $700,000 it deducted from
gross income in the year of liquidation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to apply the tax benefit doctrine to create an exception to the provisions of section 336.77
The Ninth Circuit's adherence to the literal language of section 336 was
based on the notion that the liquidated corporation itself had not recaptured
economic benefit.78 If South Lake Farms, Inc. had sold the barley and cotton

crops before liquidation and attempted to shelter the profit by using section
337, the $700,000 realized gain would have been recognized under the tax
benefit doctrine.79 Yet, careful consideration of the practical effect of the liquidation scheme in South Lake Farms shows that the old corporation received a
substantial benefit- a $700,000 reduction in gross income in the year of liquidation.8 0
Although commentators have expressed concern over the results reached in
South Lake Farms,8 ' the case is uncontradicted in its interpretation of the application of the tax benefit doctrine to section 336 liquidationss2 A different
result has been reached, however, in cases concerning section 337.
As early as 1961 the Commissioner ruled that the tax benefit doctrine overrides nonrecognition under section 337. In Revenue Ruling 61-214,83 a corporation that operated an office building sold all of its assets to a single buyer
pursuant to a liquidation. The Commissioner ruled that the gain realized on
77. "Here there was no sale by the old corporation; it was completely liquidated and its
assets transferred to the [shareholders) . . . and therefore section 336 of the Internal Revenue
Code applies .... The tax falls on the actual sellers, the stockholders of the old corporation.
Section 336 prevents the imposition of the tax on the old corporation." 324 F.2d at 839,
1964-1 U.S.T.C. at 91,106.
78. "It may be that the nonrecognition provisions of section 336 would be overridden by
the rule were there an economic recapture of the deductions by the corporation. However,
since there is no such economic recapture by the corporation, it should be difficult for the
courts to apply the rule as they have done in the case of a liquidating sale under 337 to require recognition of income." O'Hare, supra note 61, at 236.
79. The Ninth Circuit refused to face this issue by stating: "We need not decide, because the question is not before us, whether the result would have been the same if the old
corporation had in fact sold the same lands and sought to escape tax under section 337." 324
F.2d at 839, 1964-1 U.S.T.C. at 91,106.
80. "A judge could well find ... that the prior deductions were taken and allowed upon
a 'condition subsequent' that the taxpayer remain in 'existence' and complete the related
income earning cycle. By liquidating in 'midstream,' the taxpayer thereby forfeits the right
to this deduction and its final return must be adjusted for this item accordingly." Eustice,
supra note 33, at 65.
81. "[T]he Ninth Circuit Court's interpretation of section 336 in South Lake Farms acts
as a wedge to reopen a fissure similar to that existing between the Court Holding Co. and
Cumberland Public Service Co. rulings which Congress had purportedly sealed by enacting
section 337." Note, supra note 73, at 903.
82. See O'Hare, supra note 61, at 234.
83. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 60. When the ruling first came out it was criticized by commentators. "[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the ruling has over-reached proper bounds
and should be withdrawn." Gutkin & Beck, Section 337: IRS Wrong in Taxing, at Time of
Liquidation, Items Previously Deducted, 17 J. TAXATION 146, 148 (1962).
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the sale of coal, plumbing supplies, and small tools, whose cost had been deducted under section 162, would be recognized notwithstanding section 337.84
The first judicial test of the Commissioner's position, Commissioner v.
5
Anders,8
involved a Kansas corporation that rented towels, coveralls, shirts,
and related items to various industries. Because the useful life of the rental
items was estimated to be one year or less, the corporation deducted the full
cost of the items in the year of their purchase as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. In May 1961 the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation
and sold all of the corporate assets in accordance with the requirements of
section 337. The corporation reported $233,000 gain realized from the sale of
the expensed rental items.80
Although the formal requirements of section 337 had been satisfied, the
Commissioner argued that the $233,000 gain in Anders realized from the sale
of the rental items should be recognized under the tax benefit doctrine. The
Tax Court, however, agreed with the taxpayer and sustained a literal application of section 337.87 On Appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and held that the tax benefit doctrine overrides the nonrecognition provisions
of section 337.8 The court stated:8 9

[T]here is no provision in the statute showing an intent to alter or bar
the application in cases under §337 of tax benefit principles fashioned
under other provisions of the Code. Therefore, we conclude that tax
benefit principles are applicable here as under other statutory provisions
and that §337 intended no disregard of them in liquidation cases.
The Anders decision has been followed in several recent cases with similar
facts. For example, in Spitalny v. United States"5 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the tax benefit doctrine overrides section 337,91 even though
the same court had decided that the doctrine did not apply to section 336

92
seven years earlier in South Lake Farms.

84.

1961-2 Cu.r. BULL. 60, 61.

85. 414 F.2d 1283, 1969-2 U.S.T.C.
(1970).

9478 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958

86. The entire cost of the rental items had been deducted as an ordinary and necessary
business expense under §162 and therefore the basis of the items was zero. See note 72 supra.
87. "The fact that the cost of the rental items had previously been expensed does not
preclude the nonrecognition of gain to the corporation under section 337. While there is
nothing in the legislative history to indicate Congress was aware of the fact pattern of this
case, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. If the result here is undesirable,
the remedy is for Congress, not the courts." D.B. Anders, 48 T.C. 815, 823 (1967).
88. 414 F.2d 1283, 1289, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 19478, at 85,203 (10th Cir. 1969).
89. Id. at 1287, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,202.
90. 430 F.2d 195, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. 19545 (9th Cir. 1970).
91.

Id. at 198, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. at 84,323-24.

92. See text accompanying note 74 supra. Although the district court in Spitalny cited
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 650, 654, 1968-2 U.S.T.C. f19602, at
88,084 (D. Ariz. 1968), the Ninth Circuit did not refer to its own decision in South Lake
Farms.
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In Spitalny the corporation had deducted the cost of feed under section 162
as an expense necessary to the operation of its cattle-feeding business. Prior to
liquidation of the corporation, the feed was sold pursuant to section 337 for
$177,437. TheNinth Circuit refused to allow the gain realized from the sale of
the cattle feed to go unrecognized and held that the tax benefit doctrine took
precedence over section 337.93
The tax benefit doctrine has also been applied to section 337 in two other
recent federal court decisions. In Connery v. United States9 4 a New Jersey corporation prepaid advertising expenses and deducted the amount paid as a
section 162 expense. In 1959 the corporation decided to liquidate and sold all
of its business assets to another corporation. Forty thousand dollars of the
purchase price represented payment for the prepaid advertising expenses. The
court held that, based on the tax benefit doctrine, the liquidated corporation
had understated its income for its final taxable year by $40,000. 95 Similarly, in
Evans v. United States90 the court held that gain from the sale of previously
expensed parts and supplies is not entitled to nonrecognition under section
337. The court stated that the precedent established by Anders, Spitalny, and
Connery "precluded treating the recovery of the previously deducted amount
of the cost of 'parts' as non-recognized gain from the sale of property in liquidation."97
The conflicting results reached in South Lake Farms on the one hand, and
Anders, Spitalny, Connery, and Evans, on the other, compels one conclusion

-;ithregard to the disposition during liquidation of items whose cost has been
deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162 - a
return to Court Holding. If they are sold pursuant to section 337, realized gain
will be recognized. If they are distributed in kind and retained by shareholders,
a tax at the corporate level is avoided. If the items are sold after liquidation,
however, the shareholders again face possible application of the Court Holding doctrine.9 8 The form of the sale assumes renewed importance and the intent of section 337 is thus defeated.

93. 430 F.2d at 198, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. at 84,323-24 (9th Cir. 1970).
94. 460 F.2d 1130, 1972-1 US.T.C. f19441 (3d Cir. 1972).
95. Id. at 1134, .1972-1 U.S.T.C. at- 84,533. "The tax imposed in Connery was not the result of the liquidation process per se; it was imposed because of the recovery of an item
previously expensed. The happenstance that the recovery took place as an additional feature
of the liquidating process does not immunize that recovery from normal tax consequences.
The prepaid advertising expenses had a zero basis before the liquidation process began; it
had the same basis during the liquidating process." Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490
F,2d 1172, 1180, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19188, at 83,280 (3d Cir. 1974).
96. 317 F. Supp. 423, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. f19612 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
97. Id. at 426, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. at 84,522.
98. "Mhe. Court. Holding and Cumberland decisions have continuing relevance; and
even in some circumstances today, it may be advantageous to liquidate a corporation first
and then have the shareholders sell its assets." D. KAHN, BASIC COPORATE TAXATION 123

(1973).
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Inventory Assets
The legislative history of section 337 reflects congressional intent that the
disposition of inventory in a liquidation be accorded equal tax treatment
under sections 336 and 337; gain realized from sales made in the ordinary
course of business must be recognized at the corporate level at ordinary rates. 90
If inventory is sold to customers prior to liquidation, the corporation realizes
ordinary income. Section 337 expressly provides that its nonrecognition provisions shall not encompass sales of inventory in the ordinary course of business. 100 Such sales are inconsistent with the fact that the corporation is in the
process of liquidating. On the other hand, appreciated inventory may be distributed in kind to the shareholders under section 336, and no tax will be
levied against the corporation. The fact that the shareholders receive the inventory in kind with a stepped-up basis and proceed to sell it in an ordinary
business manner without the corporate shell does not create an exception to
the nonrecognition provisions of section 336.101
The advantage of no tax at the corporate level can be attained in a preliquidation sale of inventory if substantially all of the inventory is sold to one
person in one transaction.1° 2 Such a bulk sale is entirely consistent with the
idea of liquidation and section 337(b)(2) allows nonrecognition of gain realized
03
in that manner.
A recent case, however, has cast some doubt on the extent to which a liquidating corporation can rely on the bulk sales provisions of section 337. In
Bishop v. United States °4 three accrual method corporations raised breeder
hens to produce eggs. Under the farm price method of accounting, each corporation valued closing inventory at a figure below actual cost. 0 As a result,
the cost of goods sold was higher than the amount actually expended for inventory during the year and the gross income of each corporation was cor-

99. See text accompanying notes 31-38 supra.
100. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §337(b)(1)(A) provides that gain will be recognized when it
is derived from the sale of "stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind
which would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, and property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business."
101. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra. When the corporation is liquidated and
the inventory is distributed in kind, the shareholders are taxed on the difference between the
fair market value of the liquidating dividend and their basis in the stock. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §331. The shareholders' basis in the distributed property is therefore equal to their
original basis plus the tax paid. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1012. In other words, the shareholders' basis is equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of distribution.

102.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §337(b)(2). See note 49 supra.

103. See generally Winer v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 684, 1967-1 U.S.T.C. r19169 (Ist Cir.
1967); The Luff Co., 44 T.C. 532 (1965). But cf. Richard W. Pastene, 52 T.C. 647 (1969) (the
delivery of mink pelts to an auction company for sale did not qualify under the bulk sales
exception to §337 because the liquidating corporation had always disposed of its pelts in that
manner).
104. 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19165 (M.D. Ga, 1971).
105. See O'Hare, supra note 61, at 227-29.
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respondingly reduced. 10° When the three corporations liquidated, the inventories of chickens were sold in bulk in accordance with section 337(b)(2). The
sales price of the chickens exceeded the farm price inventory figure used to
calculate the value of the closing inventory. Consequently, the amount of the
excess of the sales price over the farm price inventory value represented a
recapture by the corporation of an amount that should have been taxed at
ordinary income rates.
Relying heavily on the decisions in Anders, Spitalny, and Evans'0 7 the
Bishop court concluded that the tax benefit doctrine required the amount of
the prior reduction of gross income to be taxed to the liquidated corporation
notwithstanding section 337.108 If the inventories had been distributed in kind
to the shareholders pursuant to section 336 and sold in bulk after liquidation
of the three corporations, it seems clear that the $31,416 additional income
assessed in Bishop could have been avoided. The Commissioner's only argument to the contrary would be that the sale constructively occurred prior to
liquidation as in Court Holding. In other words, the Bishop decision represents another example of how judicial exceptions to section 337 may forecast
a return to "form over substance."
THE Corn ProductsDOCTmNE
The 1955 Supreme Court decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner0 9 involved a taxpayer who manufactured products from grain. To
insure an adequate supply of corn, the taxpayer hedged, buying contracts for
the purchase of corn at some future time at a fixed price. If the taxpayer overestimated his requirements when he negotiated the futures, he simply sold the
unneeded contracts at the future date. On the sale of the unwanted corn
futures, the taxpayer in Corn Products characterized the gain realized as longterm capital gain. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the contention of
the taxpayer that contracts for the purchase of corn did not fall within the exceptions to the broad definition of capital asset in what is now section 1221,110
the Court noted that the contracts were such an 'integral" part of the tax-

106. Because gross income equals gross receipts minus cost of goods sold, gross income decreases as cost of goods sold increases. See generally J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§75 (1968).
107. 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1108, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. §9165, at 85,725 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
108. Id. at 1112, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 85,728.
109. 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. §9746 (1955).
110. Corn Products involved an interpretation of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §117, which
was the predecessor to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1221. Section 1221 provides in part: "[T]he
term 'capital asset' means property held by the taxpayer ...but does not include - (1)stock
in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in
the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held
by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
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payer's business that gain realized on their sale was more properly characterized as ordinary income."n The Court reasoned: 112
Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the literal
language of the exclusions set out in that section.' 13 They were not
stock in trade, actual inventory, property held for sale to customers or
depreciable property used in a trade or business. But the capital asset
provision of §[1221] 1 4 must not be so broadly applied as to defeat
rather than further the purpose of Congress ....
Congress intended that
profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be
considered as ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss.
Limited to its facts, the Corn Products decision represents a logical judicial
approach to the practicalities of the marketplace. The legislative intent behind
section 1221 was to allow investors to pay taxes at a lower rate on those gains
that are realized as a result of the appreciation of assets over a period of
time. 11 Section 1221 was not meant to shelter those gains accrued as a result
of ordinary business activities.' 6 For many years, however, the scope of the
Corn Productsdoctrine was limited to cases concerning characterization of gain
as ordinary or capital. Because a properly planned liquidation should result
in nonrecognition of gain to the corporation, the doctrine apparently had no
effect on sections 336 or 337.
r
The Commissioner's attempts to expand Corn Products beyond its facts"'
s
had generally been unsuccessful" until Hollywood Baseball Association v.
Commissioner."9 To operate profitably, Hollywood Baseball Association, a
minor league baseball club, had agreed to sell its player contracts to major
league clubs when demanded. About one-fourth of the corporation's gross income each year was derived from the sale of such contracts. In 1957 the corporation adopted a plan of liquidation and sold all of the player contracts
pursuant to the requirements of section 337. The corporation reported the
$117,000 gain realized as nontaxable;"2 the Commissioner claimed that section
337 was inapplicable.

111. 350 U.S. 46, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 19746 (1955).
112. Id. at 46, 52, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. at 56,064 (1955).
113. See note 110 supra.
114. See note 110 supra.
115. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., 364 U.S. 130, 134, 1960-2 U.S.T.C. r19556,
at 77,488-89 (1960).
116. Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. r9746, at
56,064 (1955).
117. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-77, 1958-1 Cu,,i. BULL. 118.
118. Dcltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 661, 1968-1
U.S.T.C. ff9188 (E.D. La. 1968). See also Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 389,
1967-2 U.S.T.C. 9573 (Ct. Cl. 1967); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288
F.2d 904, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 9359 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
119. 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 9251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970),
noted in 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 609 (1971).
120. Although the player contracts were not sold to one purchaser in one transaction
within the meaning of the bulk sales provisions of §337(b)(2), it is unlikely the Corn Products
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The Tax Court held that the sale-of the contracts fell within the provisions
of section 337(b)(1)(A), 121 and that the gain was not entitled to nonrecognition
because the contracts were held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business. 122 After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court
opinion, 2 3 the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case
for consideration in light of Malat v. RiddeU1. 2 4 On remand, the Tax Court
again ruled that gain from the sale of player contracts was not entitled to nonrecognition because the contracts were held primarily for sale to customers. 25
Although finding that the contracts were not held primarily for sale to customers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the result reached by the Tax Court by
employing a rationale that represented a significant extension of the Corn
2
Productsdoctrine.1 6
Because the sale of tickets to its minor league games rather than the sale of

player contracts was the primary business purpose of Hollywood Baseball, the

2
Ninth Circuit did not hold that the contracts fell within section 337(b)(1)(A).1 7
The court did find, however, that the sale of the player contracts was an
"integral" part of the ordinary operations of Hollywood Baseball and was
therefore within the scope of the Corn Products doctrine.128 Two obstacles
militated against the application of Corn Products in the Hollywood case.
First, Corn Products had previously applied only to section 1221 assets and the
player contracts were section 1231 assets.2r Second, the Corn Products doctrine

doctrine would override an express congressional nonrecognition provision such as the bulk
sale of inventory exception. See Lee, New Case Greatly Broadens Exception to Nonrecognition Provisions of Section 337, 33 J. TAXATION 20, 23 (1970).
121. See note 100 supra.

122. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 173, 196 (1964).
123. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 350, 1965-2 U.S.T.C. 29718 (9th
Cir. 1965).
124. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 824, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 29327
(1966) (per curiam). In Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 219317 (1966), the
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the phrase "held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" in INr. Rnv. Coox or 1954,
§1221(1). The Court stated: "The purpose of the statutory provision with which we deal is
to differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a
business' on the one hand . . . and 'the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a
substantial period of time' on the other ....

A literal reading of the statute is consistent

with this legislative purpose. We hold that, as used in §1221(1), 'primarily' means 'of first
importance' or 'principally."' Id. at 572, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. at 35,671. See generally Bernstein,
"Primarilyfor Sale", A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1968).
125. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 338 (1968). The Tax Court
found that Hollywood Baseball's "motive of first importance was to hold the contracts for
sale." Id. at 345.
126. 423 F.2d 494, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 219251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970).
127.

"In short, we think it quite unrealistic to say that in fact .

.

. Hollywood's player

contracts were held by it 'principally' for sale to customers, or that sale to such customers
was 'of first importance' in its holding of the contracts." Id. at 495, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. at 82,999.
128. The court found that Hollywood Baseball "sold its players because it had to agree
to do so in order to be in business." Id. Cf. Lee, supra note 120, at 22-23.
129.

See text accompanying notes 117-118 supra. See generally Note, The, Applicability

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/3

18

Savitz: Judicial Exceptions to Section 337: A Return to Court Holding
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA IV REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

had never been held to override the nonrecognition provisions of section
337.130

The same rationale was used by the Ninth Circuit to extend the Corn
Products doctrine to section 1231 assets and to rule that the doctrine overrides
the nonrecognition provisions of section 337. The court reasoned that the
13 1
doctrine applied equally to sections 1221 and 1231 because:
[V]hether property comes under §1221 (and is therefore defined as a
capital asset) or whether it comes under §1231 (and is therefore treated
as a capital asset even though it is excluded from the §1221 definition)
should make no difference, because the policy is the same - not to give
preferential treatment to profits and losses arising from the everyday
operation of the business.
Pursuing the analogy, the court noted the similarity between the statutory exceptions to section 337 and the exceptions to capital asset status as defined in
section 12211-32 and held that the Corn Products doctrine overrides the nonrecognition provisions of section 337.133 Thus, the Ninth Circuit refused to
shield corporate gain realized from a section 337 sale of property that is
34
integrally related to the ordinary operation of the taxpayer's business.1
Although the Ninth Circuit indicated that the Corn Products doctrine
should apply to such section 1231-type assets as "an obsolete factory, old rental

of the Corn Products Doctrine to Dispositions of Section 1231 Property Pursuant to a Section 337 Liquidation, 51 B.U.L. REv. 120 (1971).
130. See text following note 116 supra.
131. 423 F.2d 494, 498, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. r19251, at 83,001 (9th Cir. 1970).
132. See generally Lee, supra note 120, at 22. Some courts have stated that §337 applies
only to the gradual appreciation in value of corporate assets. See, e.g., Calley & Clark Co. v.
United States, 220 F. Supp. 111, 1963-2 U.S.T.C. 519764 (S.D. W. Va. 1963); Coast Coil Co., 50
T.C. 528 (1968), af'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 402, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. '19270 (9th Cir. 1970); Frank
W. Verito, 43 T.C. 429 (1965). See also Rev. Rul. 59-120, 1959-1 Cu. . BULL. 74, 75. "The aim
[of §337] was to promote certainty and convenience but the underlying purpose related only
to asset appreciation." Lyon, Ordinary Income May Arise in Section 337 Sales Under Assignment of Income Doctrine, 16 J. TAXATION 2, 3 (1962). But cf. Bittker, Taxation of Complete Liquidations, 26 TAX L. REV. 191, 265 (1971). Additionally, some courts hold that the
only kind of property that may be sold under §337 is that which would satisfy the definition
of "capital asset" in §1221. For example, in Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35,
1965-1 U.S.T.C. 9388 (4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth Circuit stated: "The heart of the definition
of 'property' in section 337 was taken almost verbatim from the definition of capital assets
found in Section 1221. Both sections are designed to give preferential tax treatment to sale
of certain types of assets not for sale in the ordinary course of business. We interpret them
as having the same meaning." Id. at 45, 1965-1 U.S.T.C. at 95,404. The difficulty involved in
this interpretation of the scope of §337 is that the section expressly exempts from recognition of gain, gain from the sale of corporate inventory when substantially all of it is sold
to one person in one transaction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §337(b)(2). See also Rev. Rul.
59-308, 1959-2 Cu.%. BULL. 110. The definition of capital asset in §1221 contains no such exception-for the purposes of characterization of income, sales of inventor) are always
ordinary income. lxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1221(1).
133. 423 F.2d 494, 500, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. M19251,
at 83,003 (9th Cir. 1970).
134. See Lee, supra note 120, at 23.
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cars, or lost or damaged rental tools,"13 5 a federal district court recently applied the doctrine to the sale of leased machinery. In International Shoe
Machine Corp. v. United States 36 the taxpayer corporation was engaged in
the business of manufacturing and leasing shoe machines. An awareness on the
part of the corporation's customers of the benefits of the 1962 investment tax
credit 37 prompted many of the lessees of International's machines to request
purchase of their leased equipment. Sales of the leased machines during the
years involved in the suit comprised only a small part of the income of International.'3 8 Even though the machines fell clearly within the scope of section
1231,1 39 the court held that gain from the sales of the machines was ordinary
14 0
income under the Hollywood Baseball interpretation of Corn Products.
Although the purpose of section 1231 appears to be seriously undermined
by the district court decision in InternationalShoe, the practical effect of the
decision is uncertain. The First Circuit affirmed the lower court on the basis
of Malat and a determination that International Shoe had sold the machines
in the ordinary course of business.' 41 The First Circuit did not mention the
Corn Products doctrine or Hollywood Baseball. Therefore, the case may not
represent an extension of the Corn Products doctrine at all- merely a conclusion that the corporation was engaged in the business of leasing and selling
shoe machines. Additionally, InternationalShoe involved only characterization
of realized gain. Whether gain realized from the sale of the machines would
have been recognized if International Shoe had liquidated remains unanswered.142 Nevertheless, the district court opinion is a significant indication of
the extent to which courts may expand the Corn Products doctrine.
In attempting to ascertain how far the Corn Products doctrine will be extended, it is helpful to analyze the types of assets and the kinds of transactions
it may affect. 4 3 Because the test for applying the doctrine is whether the asset
is integrally related to the ordinary business of the taxpayer, 4 4 the doctrine is
in reality nothing more than a judicial attempt to prevent avoidance of
ordinary gain realized in the conduct of a trade or business. This is the same

135. 423 F.2d 494, 503, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 29251, at 83,005 (9th Cir. 1970).
136. 369 F. Supp. 588, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 219774 (D. Mass. 1973).
137. The customers were also aware of an antitrust decree entered against one of International's prime competitors, ordering that leased machines be offered for sale. Id. at 590,
1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 82,511.
138. In 1964, 1965, and 1966 sales of leased machines represented only 7, 2, and 2%
respectively of International's gross revenues. Id. 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 82,510.
139. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1231 applies to "property used in the trade or business,
of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, held
for more than 6 months .... "
140. 369 F. Supp. at 593, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 83,514.
141. International Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
29200 (1st Cir. 1974). "The real question, therefore, concerns whether or not the income from
the sales of appellant's shoe machinery should have been characterized as having been generated in the 'ordinary course of... business.'" Id. at 160, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,317.
142. See text following note 145 infra.
143. See Lee, supra note 120, at 23.
144. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
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principle underlying such statutory recapture provisions as sections 1245 and
1250 and the judicially created tax benefit doctrine. Thus, as long as the Corn
Products doctrine applies only to those assets whose disposition should produce
ordinary income, it is not subject to serious criticism.
The difficulty created by the extension of the Corn Products doctrine lies
in its unequal application to liquidation transactions. Although Hollywood
Baseball seems to have firmly established the principle that the Corn Products
doctrine overrides the nonrecognition provisions of section 337, it is doubtful
the same result would be reached under section 336. For example, if the baseball club had liquidated and distributed the player contracts to the shareholders, no tax would have been assessed at the corporate level. If the shareholders had then sold the contracts, the only danger would have been that
the Commissioner might have attributed the sales to the defunct corporation. 145 Similarly, if International Shoe had distributed the machines in kind
to its shareholders pursuant to section 336, no tax would be imposed at the
corporate level. Conversely, the district court's reliance in InternationalShoe
on Hollywood Baseball suggests that it would require recognition of gain
realized on a sale of the machines under section 337.
CONCLUSION

Section 337 was a legislative response to the confusion caused by Court
Holding and Cumberland Public Service.146 The legislative history of the section clearly shows that it was enacted to accord identical tax treatment to preand postliquidation sales of assets. 147 Recent cases like Anders and Hollywood
Baseball, however, suggest that courts have modified somewhat the scope of
section 337. These cases reflect a concern on the part of the judiciary that gain
realized in the ordinary course of a trade or business not go unrecognized. To
the extent section 337 enables such gain to escape taxation at the corporate
level, the current judicial trend is meritorious. Liquidation should not be used
as a means of tax avoidance. Such gain, however, should not escape under section 336 either. It is therefore essential that the increasing number of exceptions to the nonrecognition provisions of section 337 be applied to section 336
as well. 148 Otherwise, the realized gain courts seek to tax by applying the tax

145. See note 98 supra.
146. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-264, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 25, at 37.
147. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1954).
148. One commentator has suggested several solutions: "The first, and most extreme...
would completely abolish nonrecognition treatment at the corporate level for all distributions of assets .. . . Less extreme would be the abolition of corporate nonrecognition treatment only for distributions of assets with an 'ordinary income potential,' such as inventory,
unrealized accounts receivable, and similar property which would yield ordinary income if
sold at the corporate level .... A third approach would retain the basic corporate nonrecognition provisions now found in sections 336 and 337, but would treat all liquidating distributions of potential ordinary income assets in a manner similar to the treatment of such items
on the death of an individual, as provided in the income in respect of a decedent rules of
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